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Abstract
In this paper we extend the analysis of the standard model of spatial discrimination with
quantity competition along the linear city to the case in which the unit transportation cost is
greater than one. We show that in such a case the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in locations is a dispersed symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, at this equilibrium firms'
locations are not monotone in the transportation cost parameter.
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The analysis of spatial price discrimination along the linear city with duopolistic Cournot competition
and identical linear demand at all addresses has almost always be conﬁned to situations with low
transportation costs, so as to ensure full market coverage by both ﬁrms from any possible pair of
locations (Anderson and Neven, 1991; Hamilton et al, 1989). Under the assumption that the ratio
between the unit constant transportation cost t and the maximum demand price (normalized to 1 in
the sequel) is lower than 1/2, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is agglomeration at the center
of the linear city, which in turn implies a perfect symmetry of ﬁrms’ behaviour at all market addresses.
An extension of the analysis to the range t ∈ [1/2,1] has been provided by Chamorro Rivas (2000). He
shows that the agglomerated equilibrium coexists with a dispersed equilibrium for t>2/3: the latter
entails duopolistic interaction at all addresses for t ∈ (2/3,10/11), while it allows for monopolistic
areas (not including the ﬁrms’ locations) at the extremes of the city for t ∈ [10/11,1].I n t h i s n o t e
we study the behaviour of the Cournot spatial markets for t ∈ [1,4). Our main result is that in this
range a symmetric, dispersed equilibrium exists for all transportation costs, which entails duopolistic
competition in a central area, and monopoly of each ﬁrm on a segment at the extreme of its market
side — the monopolistic areas including the ﬁrms’ location for t ≥ 1.3453. The scope for duopolistic
interaction at the center of the city vanishes when t =4 . For higher values of t ﬁrms become fully
separated monopolists.
2 The basic setup
Consider a linear city of unit length, along which consumers are uniformly distributed. Two ﬁrms,
labelled 1 and 2, are engaged in a location-quantity game. They have to decide their respective locations
and then compete in quantities at all market addresses x ∈ [0,1], bearing a unit transportation cost
linear in distance, and facing the linear (inverse) market demand P (Q(x)) = 1 − Q(x). We rule out
arbitrage by assuming inﬁnite transportation costs on the consumers’ side. This two-stage game is
solved by backward induction.
Denote with a the location of ﬁrm 1 and with 1−b the location of ﬁrm 2 (where a ≤ 1−b) The unit
transportation costs incurred by the ﬁrms to serve an address x can be written as t|a − x| = td1(x)
and t|1 − b − x| = td2(x),w h e r et is a positive constant. Therefore, given that each point x can be



























i > 0 irrespective of a and b,o n l yi ft<1/2,w h i l eqM
i > 0 irrespective of a and b only
if t<1. These assumptions highly simplify the solution of the location stage. The former ensures
that for all a and b ﬁrms interact duopolistically at all addresses; the latter ensures that for all a and
b all addresses are served by at least one ﬁrm. If these assumptions are relaxed, the pattern of market
coverage (i.e., for any of the addresses full coverage, coverage by one ﬁrm, or no coverage) becomes
contingent on the location pair. This is the issue we deal with in the next section.
13 Transportation costs, market coverage and equilibria
Assume t ∈ [1/2,4). Given that leapfrogging is ruled out by deﬁnition, the set of the ﬁrms’ feasible
choices in terms of distance from the right and left extremes of the line is L =
©
(a,b) ∈ R2
+ | b ≤ 1 − a
ª
.
This set can be partitioned into several subsets, according to the possibility for ﬁrms to deliver positive
quantities at the various market addresses. In particular, given that: (i) qD
1 vanishes at the right
endpoint x =1for a =1−1/2t −b/2;( i i )qD
2 vanishes at the left endpoint x =0for b =1−1/2t−a/2;
(iii) qD
1 and qD
2 vanish at the other ﬁrm’s location for b =1− 1/2t − a;t h e nf o rt ∈ [0.5,1) the set L
can be partitioned into the following subsets:
• D ≡
©
(a,b) ∈ L | a>1 − 1
2t − 1




, which includes all (a,b) pairs such that
qD
1 (x) and qD
2 (x) > 0, ∀x;
• A ≡
©
(a,b) ∈ L | a ≤ 1 − 1
2t − 1




,w h e r e(a,b) are such that qD
1 (x) > 0 for
x ∈ [0,x1), qD
1 (x)=0for x ∈ [x1,1],w h e r ex1 > 1 − b,w h i l eqD
2 (x) > 0 ∀x;
• A0 ≡
©
(a,b) ∈ L | a>1 − 1
2t − 1




, which is the set symmetrical to A;
• B ≡
©
(a,b) ∈ L | a ≤ 1 − 1
2t − 1
2b ∧ b ≤ 1 − 1
2t − 1
2a and b>1 − 1
2t − a
ª
, which comprises the (a,b)
pairs such that qD
1 (x) > 0 for x ∈ [0,x1), qD
1 (x)=0for x ∈ [x1,1],w h e r ex1 > 1 − b,a n d
qD
2 (x) > 0 for x ∈ (x2,1], qD
2 (x)=0for x ∈ [0,x2], x2 <a ;
• C ≡
©
(a,b) ∈ L | b ≤ 1 − 1
2t − a
ª
, whose elements are such that qD
1 (x) > 0 for x ∈ [0,x1), qD
1 (x)=
0 for x ∈ [x1,1],w h e r ex1 ≤ 1−b,a n dqD
2 (x) > 0 for x ∈ (x2,1], qD
2 (x)=0for x ∈ [0,x2],x2 ≥ a.
This basic partition, already suggested by Chamorro Rivas (2000), is shown in Figure 1(a) for t =4 /5.
When the analysis is extended to t ≥ 1, the key problem arises that for some (a,b) pairs, one or both
ﬁrms may become unable to deliver positive quantities even to market sites not reached by the rival
ﬁrm, i.e. market sites they could serve monopolistically, given the other ﬁrm’s choice.
Given that qM
1 vanishes in x =0for a =1 /t,a n dt h a tqM
2 vanishes in x =1for b =1 /t,f o rt ≥ 1
the sets A, A0, B,a n dC can in turn be partitioned according to the following scheme:
• For t ∈ [1,2),t h es e tA is partitioned into A and A,w i t hA ≡ {(a,b) ∈ A|a<1/t ∧ b ≥ 1/t}
and A ≡ {(a,b) ∈ A|a<1/t ∧ b<1/t}; similarly, A0 is partitioned into A
0 and A0,w i t hA0 ≡
{(a,b) ∈ A|a ≥ 1/t ∧ b<1/t} and A0 ≡ {(a,b) ∈ A|a<1/t ∧ b<1/t}.N o t i c e t h a t A and A0
become empty, so that A = A and A0 = A0,f o rt ≥ 2;
• For t ∈ (3/2,2], B is partitioned into three subsets: B ≡ {(a,b) ∈ B|a<1/t ∧ b ≥ 1/t}, B0 ≡
{(a,b) ∈ B|a ≥ 1/t ∧ b<1/t},a n dB ≡ {(a,b) ∈ B|a ≤ 1/t ∧ b ≤ 1/t};f o rt ∈ (2,5/2) af o u r t h
subset can be deﬁned, B ≡ {(a,b) ∈ B|a ≥ 1/t ∧ b ≥ 1/t}. Notice also that for t ∈ (5/2,4], B is
empty, and hence B turns out to be partitioned into B, B0 and B.
• For t ∈ [3/2,5/2), C is partitioned into three subsets: C ≡ {(a,b) ∈ C|a<1/t ∧ b ≥ 1/t}, C0 ≡
{(a,b) ∈ C|a ≥ 1/t ∧ b<1/t},a n dC ≡ {(a,b) ∈ C|a<1/t ∧ b<1/t};f o rt ∈ [5/2,4] af o u r t h
subset can be deﬁned, C ≡ {(a,b) ∈ C|a ≥ 1/t ∧ b ≥ 1/t},s ot h a tC can be partitioned into the
four subsets C, C, C0,a n dC.
Figures 1(b) to 1(d) show the partition of the L set for some relevant values of t.1
1To aid intuition, we remark that upper-barred sets include location pairs such that there exists at least one extreme
portion of the market which is covered by no ﬁrm. In particular, this completely unserved portion of the market lies at






, and at both extremes in B and C.
2Figure 1. Partitions of the feasible locations set
We now turn to the solution of the model. We recall that the proﬁts of ﬁrm i at an address x are
πD
i (x)=[ ( 1+tdj (x) − 2tdi (x))/3]
2, if at that address ﬁrms compete duopolistically. However, proﬁts
are πM
i (x)=[ ( 1− tdi (x))/2]
2and πj =0if ﬁrm i is monopolist at x. Moreover, given (1) and (1’),
we can easily locate the boundaries between the segments of the market served and unserved by the
two ﬁrms. In particular, qD
1 vanishes at xr
1 =1 /t − 1+b +2 a when this occurs at the right of 1 − b,
while it vanishes at xl
1 =( 1 /t +1− b +2 a)/3, when this occurs at the left of 1 − b; qM
1 vanishes at
xM
1 = a−1/t.A sf o rﬁrm 2, qD
2 vanishes at xl
2 =2−1/t−2b−a when this occurs at the left of a,a n d
at xr
2 =( 2− 1/t − 2b + a)/3 when it occurs at the right of a; ﬁnally, qM
2 vanishes at xM
2 =1 /t +1− b.
By using the deﬁnitions of the duopolistic and monopolistic proﬁts consistently with the boundaries
of the regions where they apply, we prove in the Appendix the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 For t ∈ [1,4) no equilibria exist in which one or both ﬁrms leave uncovered an extreme
segment of their market side.
The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward. In the trade-oﬀ between serving regions
of the market already covered by the rival ﬁrm and serving regions in which the ﬁrm may behave
monopolistically, this second option is obviously preferred.
3On the basis of Proposition 1, equilibria have to be looked for in the remaining sets, D, A and A0,
A and A0, B, B, C and C. In order to identify these equilibria, we proceed as follows: we ﬁrst look for
the maxima of the proﬁt functions deﬁned over each of the above sets, and identify the range of values
of t such that these maxima belong to the domains of those functions; secondly, we verify that these
candidate equilibria are robust to unilateral deviations generating location pairs belonging to alternative
sets.
Given this procedure, the analysis of the proﬁt functions allows to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (a) Let t ∈ [1/2,1]; a unique agglomerated equilibrium, aD = bD =1 /2,e x i s t sf o r
t ≤ 2/3;f o rt ∈ (2/3,1] the agglomerated equilibrium coexists with a dispersed symmetric one. The
latter is given by aD0
= bD0
=( 1 /2t) − 1/4, with full market coverage by both ﬁrms for t<10/11;
by aB = bB =
³
104t − 23 − 2
√
−117t2 + 540t − 356
´
/217t for t ∈ [10/11,1],ac a s ew h i c he n t a i l s
monopoly areas (not including the ﬁrms’ locations) at the extremes of the market; (b) Let t ∈ (1,4);
then there is a unique dispersed equilibrium at aB = bB =
³
104t − 23 − 2
√
−117t2 +5 4 0 t − 356
´
/217t











/11t,w h e nt ≥ 1.3453.
Proof. We ﬁrst look for candidate equilibria. For part (a) of Proposition 2 see Chamorro Rivas (2000).
In our setup, his proof amounts to showing that (i) given the deﬁnition of the proﬁt functions in D,
an intersection of the associated reaction functions consistently occurs in D at aD = bD =1 /2 iﬀ
t ∈ [1/2,1],a n da taD0
= bD0
=( 1 /2t) − 1/4 iﬀ t ∈ (2/3,10/11);( i i )g i v e nt h ed e ﬁnition of the proﬁt
functions in A (A0) an intersection of the associated reaction functions never occurs in A (A0); (iii)
given the deﬁnition of the proﬁt functions in B, an intersection of the associated reaction functions
consistently occurs in B for t ∈ [10/11,1] at




104t − 23 − 2
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= aB = bB for t =1 0 /11.2
As to part (b) of the Proposition, we ﬁrst notice that part (a) rules out that an equilibrium might


























The FOCs and the SOCs for their maximization are satisﬁed only by the pair given in (2), which lies
in B for all t ∈ [10/11,1.3453). Therefore, this symmetric dispersed solution, which coexists with the
agglomerated one for t ∈ [10/11,1), is the unique candidate equilibrium in the interval t ∈ [1,1.3453).
Moreover, since B coincides with B f o rt h ea b o v ei n t e r v a lo fv a l u e so ft, while it is a subset of B for
t ∈ [3/2,5/2), we can exclude that in the latter interval there might be equilibria located in B.I nC


























The FOCs and the SOCs of the corresponding maximization problem are satisﬁed for










2Notice that for t =1 0 /11 the intersection between the reaction functions associated to the sets D, A, A
0,a n dB occur
at the same point, viz., at the intersection of the boundaries of these sets, a point which we assumed to belong to B.
4which is in C for t ∈ [1.3453,4) and coincides with solution (2) for the boundary value t =1 .3453.I n
particular for t ∈ [3/2,4) the above solution lies in the C subset of C, while it is immediate to verify
that for t =4 , a = b =1 /4, a pair which lies at the boundary between C, C, C0,a n dC.
These candidate equilibria satisfy a consistency property: they are derived from proﬁt functions
which apply to speciﬁc subsets of the set of feasible locations, and actually belong to that subset, i.e.
they are pairs of maxima over restricted domains. However, for them to be equilibrium strategies pairs
over the whole space of strategies, the further condition is required that they be régime-change proof,
i.e. be maxima over the unrestricted domain of the proﬁt functions.
Consider for example ﬁrm 1’s choice when ﬁrm 2’s is set at the candidate equilibrium: (a) if
b = bD,t h e nf o rt ∈ [1/2,1] the domain of Π1(a,bD;t) lies in regions A and D;( b )i fb = bD0
,t h e nf o r
all t ∈ (2/3,4/5) the domain of Π1(a,bD0
;t) lies in regions A and D,w h i l ef o rt ∈ [4/5,10/11) it lies in
C, B, A,a n dD;( c )i fb = bB,t h e nf o rt ∈ [10/11,1) the domain of Π1(a,bB;t) lies in regions C, B,
A0 and D, while for t ∈ [1,1.3453) it is in C, B, A0 and D;( d )i fb = bC,t h e nf o rt ∈ [1.3453,1.4444)
the domain of Π1(a,bC;t) lies in C, B, A0 and D,f o rt ∈ [1.4444,1.5) it lies in C, B, A0 and A
0,f o r
t ∈ [1.5,1.756) in C, B, A0 and A
0,f o rt ∈ [1.756,2.083) in C, B, B
0 and A




0. Straightforward but tedious calculations3 conﬁrm that all candidate equilibria are indeed
maxima over the above unrestricted domains, given the intervals of values of t for which they have been
obtained: hence, they properly identify subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
The pattern of equilibria as t increases from 0 to 4 is summarized in Figure 2, where we represent
the agglomerated (dashed line) and the dispersed (solid line) equilibrium. The most relevant property
of the pattern of the latter is its being non-monotone: the idea that an increase in transportation costs
is associated to an incentive to relax competition through an increase of the distance from the rival ﬁrm
is not conﬁrmed, even for the dispersed equilibrium, over the entire domain of t. When the equilibrium
pair lies in B, the distance from the endpoints is increasing in t for t ∈ (178/181,1.3453), while it is
always decreasing in t when equilibrium is in C (C).
Figure 2: Equilibria as functions of t
3These calculations are available upon request.
5In order to explain this behaviour, we notice the distinguishing feature of this model when trans-
portation costs are high: the overall interaction between ﬁrms and the resulting location choices derive
from diﬀerent market conﬁgurations at diﬀerent addresses. Indeed, each ﬁrm competes directly with
the other in a central area, enjoys monopoly in its market side, and is prevented by high costs from
covering distant locations. Accordingly, three basic incentives are at work in the dispersed equilibrium:
(a) in the areas where ﬁrms compete in quantities, there is an incentive for both to locate farther apart
form each other as t increases; this is the ‘strategic eﬀect’ due to the ﬁrms’ incentive to serve at low
costs markets where the rival ﬁrm delivers low quantities; (b) as the increase in t makes it too costly
to cover distant locations, ﬁrms perceive the incentive to move towards the centre: this is a ‘market
coverage eﬀect’, whereby ﬁrms try to preserve a wide market coverage in order to exploit all proﬁt
opportunities; (c) ﬁnally, each ﬁrm is subject to the cost minimizing incentive to locate at the centre
of its monopoly area; this ‘monopoly eﬀect’ leads ﬁrms to relocate towards the market endpoints, as
t h ei n c r e a s ei nt widens the areas in which ﬁrms are monopolist. Clearly, the strategic eﬀect dominates
when the dispersed equilibrium lies in set D; the market coverage eﬀect prevails when the equilibrium
is in B and t>178/181; the monopoly eﬀect is the strongest when the monopoly areas extend to the
ﬁrms’ own locations, so that equilibrium is in set C.
4F i n a l r e m a r k s
In this paper we have extended the analysis of spatial discrimination with quantity competition along
the linear city to the whole range of relevant values of the transportation cost parameter, t ∈ [1/2,4).
This extension looks particularly worthwhile — and not for the mere sake of completeness. It sheds
some light on some fundamental properties of this model, which cannot emerge under the simplifying
assumptions t<1/2 or t<1. First of all, for values of t greater than 1 the dispersed equilibrium
is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the model. High values of t lead unambiguously
to dispersion, and dispersion is indeed the only outcome which makes the spatial dimension (be it a
geographical space or a product space) relevant at equilibrium. Second, our extension shows that in a
spatial market the strategic interaction between the ﬁrms at the location stage develops along several
dimensions: it involves not only the conditions under which the ﬁrms coexist on some sub-markets in
a central market area, but also each ﬁrm’s attempt to enjoy and exploit at best full monopoly in a
portion of the market, and to preserve the conditions for its own survival in distant market areas. In
this sense high transportation costs widen the explanatory power of the Cournot approach to spatial
discrimination. They generate endogenously those cost asymmetries and that multiplicity of sub-market
conﬁgurations, which are fundamental ingredients of a realistic representation of markets with spatial
properties.
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6A p p e n d i x :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Proposition 1 amounts to ruling out the possibility that equilibria may arise in the sets A, A0, B, B0,
B,C, C0 and C.




















The corresponding reaction functions intersect at (a,b)=( 9 /17t,1 − 25/17t), which however does not
belong to A (including its boundaries) for t>0. Given symmetry the same applies to A0.L e t ’ sn o w



























The corresponding reaction functions intersect at (a,b)=( 1 /t,1−21/13t), a pair which does not belong
to B (including its boundaries) for t>0. Again, since B0 is symmetrical to B, this also rules out that





























In this case the intersection of the reaction functions is at (a,b)=( a,1 − a − 8/13t),ap a i rw h i c hd o e s




























The reaction functions derived from ΠC
1 and ΠC
2 cross at (a,b)=( 1 /t,1 − 3/t), a pair which is not in
C for all relevant t ∈ [0,4). Once again, since C0 is symmetrical to C, this also applies to C0. Finally,




























Here the intersection occurs at (a,b)=( 1− b − 2/t,b), which however does not belong to C for for all
relevant t ∈ [0,4).4
4Notice that for t =4there exists a crossing of the reaction functions associated to the sets C, C0, C at a = b =0 .25,
which is at the intersection of the boundaries of those sets. However, according to our deﬁnitions, this point belongs to C.
7